TOOL DESIGN BOOK BY DONALDSON

adminComment(0)

User Review - Flag as inappropriate. Excellent book for beginners. It covers all required knowledge for a beginner to understand the concepts and. Title, Tool Design. Authors, Cyril Donaldson, V. C. Goold. Editor, George pabushobupchild.tk Cain. Edition, illustrated, reprint. Publisher, Tata McGraw-Hill, Presents fundamental methods, techniques, and practices for all areas of the design and manufacture of tools, gages, dies, and fixtures, stressing the use of.


Tool Design Book By Donaldson

Author:TARI KELLISH
Language:English, Arabic, French
Country:Malta
Genre:Academic & Education
Pages:271
Published (Last):08.05.2016
ISBN:445-2-52600-699-7
ePub File Size:20.71 MB
PDF File Size:11.74 MB
Distribution:Free* [*Registration needed]
Downloads:47792
Uploaded by: WALLY

Tool Design. Front Cover. Cyril Donaldson, George H. LeCain. Harper, - Gages - pages. 0 Reviews. From inside the book. Tool Design. Front Cover. Cyril Donaldson Tata McGraw Hill, - Tool designs - pages. 3 Reviews Flag as inappropriate. how can i copy this book?. This book concentrates on the design and making of cutting and holding tools for machine metalwork. It omits much of the overhead that is often found in such.

Therefore, the question remains: Is it possible to create a formal mechanism within the existing governance process so that the board can exercise proactively its responsibility for strategic oversight? My answer is yes. The mechanism is a formal strategic-review process—a strategic audit—which imposes its own discipline on both the board and management, much as the financial audit process does.

I believe such an audit can be designed to stand the test of time and survive the inevitable disputes over authority. The process would center the leadership of strategic oversight in the hands of independent directors and provide them with the authority to establish both the criteria for and the methods of review.

Cyril Donaldson Solutions

It would further require the board and the CEO to hold a regular, joint review of company performance. In the summer of , financial analysts began to speculate that CPC International, a leading manufacturer of food products in the United States and abroad, was ripe for major restructuring.

In the early fall, the tone and content of the speculation changed as investor discontent grew, and word on the street was that CPC was being considered for a takeover by Con-Agra, Revlon, or an inside management group.

These rumors turned into reality in October, when an investment group headed by Ronald O. Perelman attempted an unsolicited takeover. Could this outside intervention have been avoided? Quite possibly, if the board had had a formal strategic-review process in place.

It is just such an event that a strategic audit is designed to avoid. It is helpful to review the events in the CPC case leading up to the Perelman raid to see how a review process might have worked.

If CPC had had a strategic review process in place before the downturn, past performance would have signaled trouble. Corn Products was founded in with the development of a wet-milling process to refine corn by-products—corn starch, syrup, and oil—for both consumer and industrial use. In , it merged with Best Foods, which was a grocery products company with well-known brands. At the time of the merger, however, the company was dominated by the wet-milling division, which was in a capital-intensive, high-volume, low-margin industry subject to periodic bouts of competitive overbuilding.

The intent of combining the two businesses—later renamed CPC International—was to diversify the product line and enhance opportunities for growth and profitability in consumer products. Beginning around , the profitability of corn refining underwent serious, steady erosion because of overcapacity in the industry, and a widening gap developed between the performance of the corn byproducts and that of consumer foods.

For example, in , the return on assets ROA in consumer products was Despite these data, management remained committed to its traditional revenue base in corn refining and to a long-term strategy based on the expectation of improving competitive performance in that industry.

Cyril Donaldson Solutions

And management made no attempt to conceal from shareholders the effect its strategy was having on performance. Indeed, over an year period beginning in , CPC consistently used its annual report to present comparative data on the components of its corporate return on equity. Furthermore, the data were presented for the current year and the four preceding years in an identical format each time.

It is rare for a public corporation to maintain such consistency and even more unusual for it to keep reporting the drivers of equity value over such a turbulent period in its history.

Although the actual disparity in performance between corn refining and consumer products was difficult to observe early on, it was impossible to conceal during the period from to , when there was a short-term decline in the profitability of the consumer foods line.

As the data reveal, CPC reported a dramatic decline in the corporate return on equity from Through , lower margins in corn wet-milling contributed to a declining corporate profit margin. After , and subsequent to restructuring, corporate margins improved, largely because of the increased emphasis on higher-margin, branded consumer products.

CPC saw a dramatic and immediate gain in ROI in , with continued improvement in asset turnover and use of leverage. There is no record of what went on in the CPC boardroom at the time of this unfavorable public attention.

Certainly the board could not plead that it lacked objective historical evidence on the inherent weaknesses of the business. However, the costs of restructuring under the guns of a battle for control were substantial. In addition to the legal costs, there were the costs of negotiations conducted in haste and from a position of weakness—namely, the sale of underpriced assets and the redownload of over-priced stock.

And there was a management team preoccupied with staying in office rather than doing the job it was hired to do. This much we know.

I suggest we can also be sure of another thing. If a formal board-level strategic-review process had been well established before the downturn between and , periodic discussions about strategic direction between the board and management would have centered not on optimistic promises for the future but on the pessimistic realities of past performance.

The answer to all these questions is no. Management and the board have unique and distinct perspectives on strategy. Managers are charged with turning strategic vision into operational reality. Of necessity, they must focus on one strategic path at a time and pursue it relentlessly to maximize its potential for corporate profitability. If managers equivocate, they default on their obligations to employees and shareholders alike, eroding much-needed morale and commitment.

In this context, the best standard of performance by which to motivate the organization is a relative one—to ask how the company is performing relative to previous strategies, relative to the results of last quarter or last year, relative to the best competitors in the same product markets.

But performance evaluation designed to motivate the people in an organization is not intended to challenge the chosen path. Its responsibility is to represent the perspective of investors and question the strategic path itself. The strategic audit, therefore, must be directed by independent board members rather than by management insiders. And the board—not management—should select the key criteria to monitor strategic results.

Elements of the Strategic Audit Establishing the Criteria. The most important requirement for the data used in the strategic review process is that they be objective.

In addition, the criteria should be familiar, well-understood, and accepted measures of financial performance. There are two reasons why. This obligation implies evaluating performance in financial terms. Standard financial indicators facilitate discussion in terms all parties can understand.

Some will argue that using such indicators is just one more example of a myopic preoccupation with the corporate bottom line, leading to short-term decisions that erode long-term competitive strength and profitability in domestic and international product markets. I must disagree.

Although I think that financial criteria should be the central focus of board oversight, I do not think such a focus prevents the board from considering other kinds of progress. It should certainly weigh all objective—or even subjective—evidence of strategic progress demonstrating long-term competitive superiority.

But it is equally important for the board to intervene when it sees persistent, long-term erosion of the investment base, on which all corporate activity depends.

The criteria best suited to the strategic oversight process share two important characteristics.

They focus on the sustainable rate of return on shareholder investment produced by the corporate income stream. They should also allow a comparison of the promise of future returns with the reality of past performance. In the final analysis, these criteria should reflect a fundamental economic reality: The long-term loyalty of the equity holders depends solely on sustaining a competitive return on investment. Without that, no product-market strategy is safe. Although professional managers might find this dictum hard to accept, it is nevertheless the reality of the public capital markets in which they operate.

Being honored with the Amicus Award by The International Documentary Association — an honor bestowed on only two others in the year history of the awards: Steven Spielberg and John Hendricks founder of the Discovery Channel.

Serving as one of the authors of the Documentary Filmmakers Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use and being the only attorney in private practice to serve on the drafting committee for the recently released Statement of Best Practices for Online Video.

Customers who viewed this item also viewed

Assisting in the drafting and lobbying for Orphan Works legislation. Being the sole American attorney to assist in the drafting of the Rome Resolution of to harmonize Fair Use across the European Union. Holding the position of President of the International Documentary Association. Organizing and leading the Documentary Credits Coalition in negotiations with the cable networks to prevent the wholesale migration of credits from the screen to the Internet.

His book Clearance and Copyright, now in its fourth edition, is used in over 50 film schools and has become the standard industry reference book. Aside from lecturing frequently at law and film schools across the United States and in Europe, Michael is an avid skier, worldwide hiker and kayaker, and award-winning photographer. He also won a gold medal at the Senior Olympics for Parallel Bars and a silver medal on the rings. Grudin, J. Harrison, S. Hassenzahl, M.

Isbister, K. Jordan, P. Taylor and Francis, London Google Scholar Krippendroff, K.

Mahlke, S. University of Athens Google Scholar McCarthy, J.

Account Options

Norman, D. Palen, L.Through , lower margins in corn wet-milling contributed to a declining corporate profit margin. However, I do think that being a Christian helps one make better sense of the world we live in.

At least initially, the board and its consultant would need a great deal of cooperation and assistance from management.

Tool Design by George Le Cain and Cyril Donaldson (1973, Hardcover)

Afzal Mahi rated it it was amazing Apr 18, Absent such unique personal prerogatives, board members are expected to serve as supportive critics of the strategy in place. Norman, D. Apple - Mac mini, Apple, Inc. They can hardly be expected to have the detailed command of the issues and the requisite independent judgment necessary to make compelling proposals to counter those of management.

The customary agenda is set by the chair and invariably focuses on details of implementing the ongoing business strategy.